The Jail House Informant,Police Complicity
In April 1983, police moved a 17-year-old from juvenile hall to the Los Angeles County Jail’s notorious snitch tank — the 7000 Module — in defiance of a juvenile court order. Within days, three veteran jailhouse informants surfaced claiming Bruce had confessed. The convergence was not coincidence. In 1989, a Los Angeles County Grand Jury confirmed what defense attorneys had long suspected: county jails were running a confession-manufacturing apparatus — staff deliberately placed informants alongside targeted defendants, and prosecutors used the resulting testimony to win convictions 348 349. The near-total absence of perjury prosecutions 355 told the rest of the story.
The court order that was defied. On April 4, 1983, Sylmar Juvenile Court Judge Martha Goldin ordered Bruce retained in juvenile hall 679, acting on a probation report that found juvenile hall appropriate to his case and emotional state 455C. Four days later, without the required court order 455B, police moved him to the adult 332 County Jail’s 7000 Module — the “hospital floor” 427 — the very unit the Grand Jury would later identify as the place where staff seeded targets for informants to book 677. To police it functioned as a black-box amplifier: place a defendant, wait, and “sooner or later” 354 a snitch would surface claiming a confession.
The State has called this an accident. The “accident” required paperwork filed in defiance of an order entered four days earlier; placement not in general population but in the 7000 Module specifically; and within that module, a four-man cell isolated from every other juvenile, flanked by cells holding three known adult informants — with holes two to three inches across bored through the dividing walls, giving all three unrestricted contact with a 17-year-old. The arrangement violated Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 207b, 208a, and 707.1, which forbid placing juveniles in adult jail without a court order and prohibit any contact, even momentary, with adult prisoners.
- The un-taped first visit to Hughes. Roughly two weeks before Hughes’ taped interview, detectives paid him a first visit that was neither recorded nor transcribed 459. No legitimate purpose explains that decision. The most plausible explanation is the most damning: a coaching session — assess his capabilities, correct inconsistencies, align his claims with the prosecution’s theory. The rough spots were smoothed, but because the foundation was a lie, contradictions remained. [Cf. § V]
- The music-and-money motive — and where it came from. Informants Dowtu and Wallace both claimed Bruce had confessed the attack grew from an argument over money and loud music 456. That was also, not coincidentally 351, Monsue’s early theory of the crime 458. It is fabrication.
When I moved out of my family’s home I took my stereo receiver and albums with me. No albums, tapes, working stereo, or speakers were found in or around my former bedroom during the six-plus hours police searched the house on March 10 548. There was an old broken Sanyo turntable in that room — which I mentioned to Monsue at interrogation 457. Monsue is the only link connecting that statement, his own report, and Dowtu and Wallace, whom he interviewed at County Jail on April 21 456. With Hughes’ first interview unrecorded [Cf. § V (2)] and almost certainly a coaching session 459, picturing Monsue seeding the “music” and “theft” elements before the tape ran takes no leap.
He may not have needed to. At 17, naive and trusting, I answered enough of Dowtu’s and Wallace’s probing questions to lay out virtually the entire police theory — not knowing they were taking notes 678. Monsue also volunteered his music 458 and theft 467 theories to suspect John “Mike” Ryan, Jr. in Gulfport, Mississippi. And next-door neighbors, home that day, told Monsue they heard nothing unusual 271. No independent evidence supports the music claim.
- Rabichow’s “only the killer knew” claim — false on three counts. To shore up Hughes’ credibility, prosecutor Rabichow asserted the snitch knew details “only the killer” could know. He made the claim in open court 450 and repeated it in writing — to the California Department of Corrections, that Hughes possessed details “THAT COULD HAVE COME ONLY FROM SOMEONE PRESENT AT THE LOCATION AT THE TIME OF THE MURDER” 674, and to David Disco of the District Attorney’s Office, that Hughes “TESTIFIED TO DETAILS OF THE KILLING THAT ONLY THE KILLER KNEW, INCLUDING WHICH ROOMS DIFFERENT ALTERCATIONS TOOK PLACE AND THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY TOOK PLACE.” 675 Tellingly, his later petition to Orange County Superior Court Judge Donald A. McCartin for Hughes’ early release contained no “only the killer knew” language — perhaps because everything Hughes testified to could be found in Monsue’s reports or heard in his April 4 hearing testimony.
(a) The State said Hughes’ knowledge of blood spatter was something only the killer could know 450. In fact, “spatter,” “spattered,” “spatterings,” “spot,” and “spots” of blood were spoken twenty-three times at the April 4 detention hearing 451. I sat through that hearing and encountered Hughes as few as four days later.
(b) The follow-up police report names each room where bloody weapons were recovered 364. I shared my copy of that report with Hughes. His ability to name the weapons and rooms 363 is not insider knowledge — it is evidence he read the report and lied. Steak knives found in the hallway; Hughes placed the stabbing in the hallway. Trophy and exercise bar found in the master bedroom near blood spots and stains 636, 637, 640, 641; Hughes placed the shirt-ripping there. But blood-spatter patterns showed blunt-force blows in the entry hallway 648, the living-room hallway 643, the master-bedroom hallway 636, and the hallway adjoining the three back bedrooms 632 — locations Hughes never specified.
(c) Rabichow got the sequence wrong. The physical evidence and Rosie Lisker’s observed injuries establish that the attack order Hughes described — the RKTB sequence — is physically impossible. [Cf. § V (3) (a) (b) (c) (d)]
Tested against the record, nothing Hughes “knew” survives. The blood-spatter “secret” was aired twenty-three times in open court. The room-and-weapon details came from a police report. The motive was Monsue’s theory, planted or parroted. The sequence was physically impossible. The State’s presentation of Hughes was a Potemkin’s Village — a facade with nothing behind it, assembled from an ailing six-year plea-bargain case, an informant desperate for freedom, and a prosecution determined to convict at any cost to the truth.
Footnotes
That answer doesn't survive the rest of the record. By the time the paramedics arrived I was in the driveway in front of our house, screaming at them — independently confirmed by both law enforcement and fire department personnel on scene. The neighbors directly east apparently heard none of it.
↩"Regardless of how this testimony is evaluated, it cannot be ignored. But for one informant's public exposure of these practices the Special Counsel would probably not have been appointed to investigate and present evidence before the Grand Jury and the extent of this problem within Los Angeles County would not have been examined by the Grand Jury."
* “We know the defendant did it.” Police and others in law enforcement who somehow "know the defendant did it" are not a rare or recent development. They are the very reason for due-process jurisprudence — the reason we do not lock people up, or summarily execute them, on mere suspicion, "gut feeling," or whim. They are why we demand a higher standard of justice. The fact that even those more stringent safeguards sometimes fail is why we have courts of appeal and a two-tiered (state and federal) legal system to hear petitions for redress. It is why Habeas Corpus — the so-called "prisoner's last chance" — not only exists but was incorporated by the Framers into the most important document in the land: the Constitution of the United States. This is no small afterthought and no trifling matter of "legal technicality." It is an essential component of all our freedom.
Van Nuys police probably would have reported that they also "knew the defendant did it" after encountering me disheveled, long-haired and bloody-handed, hysterical and ranting outside the home in which my mom — with whom I'd had a history of disagreements — lay beaten, stabbed, unconscious, and near death. And in remarkable accord with the Grand Jury's report, law enforcement in my case did, in fact, find that "sooner or later those [snitch] statements become available" to them.
A senior officer in the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office, under oath, admitted that he assumed every jailhouse informant was a liar — and used them anyway. Not as deterrents. As tools. The State's own management knew the men it was putting on the witness stand could not be believed. They used them in my case all the same.
↩[Footnote 355 is not present in the source Footnotes - 1-719.docx. Bruce — please add the citation here.]
Copy again readable] IT'S AN EXERCISE MACHINE. IT'S GOT TWO GRIPS ON IT, TWO HANDLE GRIPS AND THERE'S A BIG STRING IN THE MIDDLE AND IT'S KIND OF, YOU KIND OF DO ISOMETRICS WITH IT. WHALED ON HER WITH THAT FOR A LITTLE WHILE, AND HE MENTIONED SOMETHING, HE REALLY STARTED PANICKING THEN CAUSE SHE WAS STILL ALIVE, SAID SHE WAS STILL BREATHING. HE STARTED BLOWING IT, SO HE SMASHED HER HEAD IN TO MAKE SURE THAT, YOU KNOW, HER BRAIN WAS PRETTY WELL GONE SO SHE WOULDN'T BE, YOU KNOW, ABLE T0, HE WAS GETTING SCARED SHE'D TELL ON HIM." [emphasis added]
↩Reading the LAPD Follow-Up Investigation report from beginning towards end, the following passages are encountered, in the sequence indicated:
And consider the testimony heard by the Grand Jury, wherein a certain inmate was placed in the jail's "hospital section" (i.e., the 7000 Module, where I met Hughes), and said to be suicidal so that jail staff could place a snitch in his cell, ostensibly to alert jailers if he attempted to harm himself. But of course the snitch presented almost immediately with an alleged confession:
I was present at all times in the courtroom when this testimony was given, and thus heard: 1) What a 'spatter' and 'blood spot' are; 2) What types of forces/actions cause spatters and blood spots; 3) The fact that police claimed to have found blood spatters on my T-shirt, outer shirt, pants and shoes; 4) The relative number of these alleged spots (assuming I had a view of the small tags police had attached to the clothing (I did have); and 5) That a large part of the police allegation rested on the allegedly inculpatory spots and spatters. When I was questioned by Hughes, these were all pertinent facts which flowed freely from my naive lips into the ears of the liar.
↩Welfare & Institutions Code Section 707.1 "IF THE MINOR IS DECLARED NOT A FIT AND PROPER SUBJECT TO BE DEALT WITH UNDER THE JUVENILE COURT LAW, THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OR OTHER APPROPRIATE PROSECUTING OFFICER SHALL ACQUIRE THE AUTHORITY TO FILE AN ACCUSATORY PLEADING AGAINST THE MINOR IN A COURT OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION. THE CASE SHALL PROCEED FROM THAT POINT ACCORDING TO THE LAWS APPLICABLE TO A CRIMINAL CASE, PROVIDED THAT UNLESS THE JUVENILE COURT SPECIFICALLY ORDERS THE INDIVIDUAL MINOR DELIVERED TO THE CUSTODY OF THE SHERIFF UPON A FINDING THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE MINOR IN THE JUVENILE HALL WOULD ENDANGER THE SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC OR [...] BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE OTHER INMATES DETAINED IN JUVENILE HALL, THE MINOR, IF DETAINED, SHALL REMAIN IN THE JUVENILE HALL PENDING FINAL DISPOSITION BY THE CRIMINAL COURT. IF A PROSECUTION HAS BEEN COMMENCED IN ANOTHER COURT BUT HAS BEEN SUSPENDED WHILE JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS ARE BEING HELD, IT SHALL BE ORDERED THAT THE PROCEEDINGS UPON SUCH PROSECUTION RESUME. WHEN A PERSON UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE IS DETAINED PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION IN A FACILITY IN WHICH ADULTS ARE CONFINED, IT SHALL BE UNLAWFUL TO PERMIT SUCH PERSON TO COME OR REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH SUCH ADULTS." [emphasis added] First, the Sylmar Juvenile Court did not find that my presence in the juvenile hall would "endanger the safety of the public" or "be detrimental to the other inmates detained in juvenile hall." The Court also did not"specifically order [me] delivered to the custody of the Sheriff." Go figure. And in further violation of the statute, once I was delivered, in defiance of a court order, into the custody of the Sheriff, I .was illegally permitted "to come or remain in contact" with the adult snitches. and consider Welfare & Institutions Code Section 207 (b) "NO COURT, JUDGE, REFEREE, OR PEACE OFFICER SHALL KNOWINGLY DETAIN IN ANY JAIL OR LOCKUP ANY PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18 YEARS, UNLESS A JUDGE OF THE JUVENILE COURT SHALL DETERMINE THAT THERE ARE NO OTHER PROPER AND ADEQUATE FACILITIES FOR THE CARE AND DETENTION OF SUCH PERSON, OR UNLESS SUCH PERSON HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED BY THE JUVENILE COURT TO ANOTHER COURT FOR PROCEEDINGS NOT UNDER THE JUVENILE COURT LAW AND HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH OR CONVICTED OF A FELONY. IF ANY PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 19 YEARS IS TRANSFERRED BY THE JUVENILE COURT TO ANOTHER COURT AND IS CHARGED WITH OR CONVICTED OF A FELONY AS HEREIN PROVIDED AND IS NOT RELEASED PENDING HEARING, SUCH PERSON MAY BE COMMITTED TO THE CARE AND CUSTODY OF A SHERIFF, CONSTABLE, OR OTHER PEACE OFFICER WHO SHALL KEEP SUCH PERSON IN THE JUVENILE HALL OR IN SUCH OTHER SUITABLE PLACE AS SUCH LATTER COURT MAY DIRECT, PROVIDED THAT NO SUCH PERSON SHALL BE DETAINED IN OR COMMITTED TO ANY HOSPITAL EXCEPT FOR MEDICAL OR OTHER REMEDIAL CARE AND TREATMENT OR OBSERVATION." [emphasis added] The Sylmar Juvenile Court judge did if fact determine that a “proper and adequate facility" for my care and detention existed -- the juvenile hall she ordered me retained in: DDA Rabichow's reading of the Sylmar Juvenile Court discussion on April 4, 1983, concerning where I was to be housed
'THERE ARE NO ADULT PRISONERS IN JUVENILE HALL.' "; Yet on April 8, just four days after this very unambiguous court order, I was illegally transferred to the County Jail. There, staff who knew that I was a minor (per Hughes' testimony of a "juvenile"
tag on my door? and were thus obligated to keep me away from -all adults, placed me in continuing contact with the snitches Hughes, Dowtu and Wallace. Welfare & Institutions Code Section 208 (a) WHEN ANY SUCH PERSON UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE IS DETAINED IN OR SENTENCED TO ANY INSTITUTION IN WHICH ADULTS ARE CONFINED, IT SHALL BE UNLAWFUL TO PERMIT SUCH PERSON TO COME OR REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH SUCH ADULTS. [emphasis added]
↩This is either an early police theory of the crime or Monsue's scare tactics for Ryan. I had no contact with Ryan after March 8, when I encountered him on Orion Avenue approaching our street, and drove him to the Haskell onramp to the westbound Ventura Freeway.
↩- 639
↩DDA RabichoW°s Memo to David Disco, November 4, 1988
↩DDA Rabichow's reading of the Sylmar Juvenile Court discussion concerning where I would be housed
